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NEGLIGENCE-CAUSATION-LlABILITY UNDER STATUTE FOR INJURY RE-
SULTING FROM Fnm STARTED BY RA:rr.RoAD LocoMoTIVE-Sparks from defend-
ant's train started a fue on defendant's right of way which spread toward 
plaintiff's farm. Plaintiff, in an attempt to contain the .fire, plowed a .fire 
guard along the edge of his property. While driving his tractor to a safe 
place after completing the last furrow, he ran over a root or limb which flew 
up and struck him in the eye, causing blindness. In the trial court plaintiff 
recovered from the railroad under an Oklahoma statute which specified that 
"Any railroad company operating any line in this state shall be liable for all 
damages sustained by fue originating from operating its road.'11 On appeal, 
held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. The .fire was the proximate cause of 
the injury. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Ginn, (Okla. 1953) 264 P. (2d) 
351. 
Many jurisdictions, not being satisfied with the common law requirement 
that railroads use ordinary care to prevent .6res,2 have enacted statutes which 
do not require proof of negligence, but impose liability upon the railroad upon 
a showing that plaintiff suffered damages resulting from a fue which either 
originated on a railroad right of way or was caused by railroad operations.3 
Statutes imposing this strict liability have uniformly been held constitutional.t 
Some of these statutes cover property damages only.5 Others make the rail-
road liable for all damages arising from fires which it causes.6 Courts usually 
adhere to the idea that contributory negligence is not a defense to liability 
under these statutes7 unless it is gross negligence.8 Most courts, as evidenced 
by the principal case, apply the doctrine of proximate cause to determine the 
railroad's liability under these statutes, but there is authority to the effect that 
l Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 2, §748. 
2 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Howe, (Ky. 1952) 243 S.W. (2d) 905; Pollard v. Walton, 
55 Ga. App. 353, 190 S.E. 396 (1937). 
3 Under the statute in the principal case, plaintiff need not prove negligence. Midland 
Valley R. Co. v. Barton, 191 Okla. 359, 129 P. (2d) 1007 (1942); Schaff v. Coyle, 121 
Okla. 228, 249 P. 947 (1926). For a similar view in other states, see Nelson v. Chicago, 
B. & 0. R. Co., 47 S.D. 228, 197 N.W. 288 (1924); Jasper v. Wabash R. Co., (Mo. App. 
1929) 24 s.w. (2d) 243. 
4 Grissell v. Housatonic R. Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 A. 137 (1886); Dickelman Mfg. Co. 
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. Ohio 1929) 34 F. (2d) 70. 
5 An example is the Missouri statute: ''Each railroad corporation owning or operating 
a railroad in this state shall be responsible in damages to every person and corporation 
whose property may be injured or destroyed by fire communicated directly or indirectly by 
locomotive engines in use upon the railroad owned or operated by such railroad corpora-
tion .••• " 37 Mo. Stat. Ann. (1953) §537.380. 
6 An example is the Ohio statute: "Every company, or the receiver of such company, 
operating a railroad or a part of a railroad, is liable for all loss or damage by fues originating 
upon the land belonging to such company caused by operating such railroad." Ohio Rev. 
Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4963.37. 
7 Fraser-Patterson Lumber Co. v. Southern R. Co., (D.C. S.C. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 
424; Kansas Oity S.R. Co. v. Harris, 105 Ark. 374, 151 S.W. 992 (1912). 
s Union Seed Co. v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 121 Ark. 585, 181 S.W. 898 
(1916). For cases where statutes have created an express exception when the owner is 
guilty of contributory negligence, see Hubbard v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 72 Conn. 
24, 43 A. 550 (1899); Martin v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 62 Conn. 331, 25 A. 239 (1892). 
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liability attaches irrespective of a determination of proximate cause.9 There 
is a distinct split among the courts on whether recovery can be made by one 
who is burned or injured by over-exertion in fighting a fire which threatened 
his home. The weight of authority seems to be with those courts that apply 
the usual proximate cause equation, saying that since the intervening act of 
the plaintiff in fighting the fire is foreseeable and probable, the causal chain 
is not broken and plaintiff may recover.10 This doctrine has been extended 
to encompass a case where plaintiff was trying to protect the property of an-
other.11 The minority view, based on the often-criticized case of Seale v. Gulf, 
C. & S. F. R. Co.,12 is that the attempt to put out the fire is in itself the 
proximate cause of any injury plaintiff may receive while engaged in the 
attempt, even though he may have acted in a reasonable manner.13 Some 
majority view cases have strained the causal chain close to the breaking point.14 
The principal case is one of them. Here, while the injury undoubtedly 
happened because of the fire, it was of a type which might well have occurred 
while the plaintiff was plowing his farm on any other day. Thus, to allow 
recovery might seem to create liability because of a fortuitous coincidence. 
The customary rules of proximate cause logically dictate recovery by the plain-
tiff because the actions of plaintiff in protecting his home certainly are to 
be expected and the injury did result from the expectable acts. Of course, 
if one requires that the injury itself be expectable, the defendant must pre-
vail. -It is this latter view that is offered by the dissenting judges in the 
principal case as one reason for not allowing recovery, 15 and the same theory 
9 Thompson v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 24 S.C. 366 (1885); Fraser-Patterson Lumber 
Co. v. Southern R. Co., note 7 supra. 
10 Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 30 N.D. 456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915); Glanz v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 119 Iowa 611, 93 N.W. 575 (1903). A leading case sup-
porting this view contains the following language: "Appellant was bound to anticipate, 
when the fire started, that decedent would try to put it out. . . • if in so doing the fire 
which appellant had negligently set out spread to and ignited clothing without any want 
on her part of the care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the 
circumstances, the appellant should be held to have anticipated such result probable, and 
to be liable therefore." Illinois Central R. Co. v. Siler, 229 ill. 390 at 394, 82 N.E. 362 
(1907). 
11 Liming v. Illinois Central R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N.W. 66 (1890). 
12 65 Tex. 274 (1886). For a criticism of the Seale case, see 4 SHEARMAN AND RED-
PIBLD, NEGLIGENCE, rev, ed., 1734 (1941). 
1s Pike v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (C.C. N.H. 1889) 39 F. 255; Braden v. St. Louis-
San Francisco R. Co., 223 Ala. 659, 137 S. 663 (1931); Allison v. St. Louis Southwestern 
R. Co., (Tex. 1924) 257 S.W. 959. 
14 Other examples are Serafian v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., (Tex. 1897) 42 S.W. 
142 (railroad not liable for injury caused by sleeping on neighbor's cold floor after house 
burned down); Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Hinton, 141 Ala. 606, 37 S. 635 
(1904) (railroad liable where child crawled back into burning house after being safely 
removed and left on veranda); Braden v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., note 13 supra 
(railroad not liable for injury caused by plaintiff's falling off a ladder while preparing to 
fight fire on roof). · 
15 "However, it cannot be said with equal logic that one guilty of negligence is 
required to anticipate that injury may occur from some unknown and unidentified force not 
actively concerned with or identified as being a part of the result of defendant's negligence." 
Principal case at 355. 
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is often the basis for decisions supporting the minority view.16 The minority 
in the principal case also admits that the law as stated by the majority is 
correct, but concludes, that this is not the place to apply it.17 It appears that 
the dissenting judges have chosen this way to express their dissatisfaction with 
the far-reaching result that the principles of causation command. Neverthe-
less, in view of the absolute character of the statute involved, and the duty 
imposed on the farmer to mitigate damages by thwarting the fire, 18 the re-
sult of the principal case is perfectly consonant with good reason. 
Howard. N. Thiele, Jr., S.Ed. 
16 Allison v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., note 15 supra; Seale v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. 
Co., note 13 supra. 
17 Principal case at 354. 
18 Glanz v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., note 10 supra; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Fry, 
157 Tenn. 376, 8 S.W. (2d) 363 (1928). 
